Introducing school accountability may create incentives for e¢ ciency. However, if the performance measure used does not correct for pupil characteristics, it will lead to an inequitable treatment of schools and create perverse incentives for cream-skimming. We apply the theory of fair allocation to show how to integrate empirical information about the educational production function in a coherent theoretical framework. The requirements of rewarding performance and correcting for pupil characteristics are incompatible if we want the funding scheme to be applicable for all educational production functions. However, we characterize an attractive subsidy scheme under speci…c restrictions on the educational production function. This subsidy scheme uses only information which can be controlled easily by the regulator. We show with Flemish data how the proposed funding scheme can be implemented. Correcting for pupil characteristics has a strong impact on the subsidies (and on the underlying performance ranking) of schools.
1 without increasing their real e¢ ciency. For some pupils it might then become di¢ cult to …nd an adequate school.
In this paper we focus on that second issue. Is it possible to devise a funding scheme that introduces incentives for better performance in terms of test scores without creating incentives for cream-skimming? How to correct observed test scores for those determinants which are not controlled by the schools themselves? To focus on this question, we take it for granted that the de…nition of the relevant outputs has been settled before. We also neglect the practical implementation issues, that have been discussed in the literature. We assume that the phenomenon of pupils moving from one school to another is taken into account in a satisfactory way. We neglect the fact that the measurement scheme may yield unreliable (in the sense of highly volatile) results for small schools, due to the limited number of observations (Kane and Staiger, 2002) . Most importantly, we assume that su¢ cient data are available to calculate value-added, i.e., the gain in test scores, at the 3 level of the individual pupils. It is well known that informationally less demanding accountability schemes (based on the level or the di¤erence in average test scores, or the gain in average scores of a cohort) will never be su¢ cient to correct for di¤erences in the individual characteristics of the pupils (Meyer, 1997; Hanushek and Raymond, 2003) . Starting from the most favourable informational assumptions, i.e., assuming that individual score gains can be calculated, allows us to focus on the basic conceptual issues.
Our model is formulated as a problem of how to link …nancial incentives to performance in terms of test scores. Such high-stakes testing is only one possible interpretation of the model, however, and our approach is also relevant in other settings. Consider an educational system in which parents can basically choose any school within the public sector and school funding is based on the number of pupils. This is more or less the system in countries like New Zealand and Belgium. Schools will then try to improve their performance in order to attract more pupils and report cards can improve market transparency. However, in this setting it is also easier for schools to build up a better reputation if they attract stronger pupils and this tendency is reinforced by peer e¤ects. There is therefore a danger of segregation. Even if explicit cream-skimming is legally forbidden, it is not di¢ cult for schools to devise strategies that make themselves more attractive for better students and less attractive for students from weaker socio-economic groups or from ethnic minorities. Report cards designed to make the market more transparent, should then certainly spread information about outcome measures with due correction for pupil characteristics. Or, one could consider moving away from simple lump sum funding per pupil and introducing special …nancing arrangements for weaker groups of pupils (Del Rey, 2004) . The problem of formulating such special …nancing arrangements is formally equivalent to our problem. Moreover, individualized funding taking into pupil characteristics in a system of free school choice is formally equivalent to the design of di¤erentiated voucher schemes (Epple and Romano, 2008) , the only di¤erence being that the voucher goes "directly" to the schools.
We introduce our theoretical framework in section 2. This framework is derived from the social choice literature on fair allocations (Fleurbaey, 2008) . We will argue that in general, i.e., for any educational production function, there is a deep con ‡ict between creating incentives for e¢ ciency and avoiding incentives for cream-skimming. However, in a special (not necessarily unrealistic case),
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The assumption that y is a scalar is not very restrictive, as y may be seen as a weighted combination of several output indicators. Moreover, at this abstract level, y does not necessarily refer to the score(s) on a cognitive test. It can be a non-linear transformation of such scores, it can refer to the distance to a threshold level or even to the earnings potential of pupils as a result of educational performance (as advocated by Cawley et al., 1999) . Following the literature on value added measures, y can also be interpreted as the individual gain in test scores during a given period.
We discuss some of these interpretations at the end of section 2.2, but, for convenience, we call y here a simple test score. Initial test scores will enter our model as one of the pupil level variables in C. Note that in this interpretation the function f is the standard explanatory model of test scores as estimated in the educational literature; see, e.g., Hanushek (2006) for an overview. Such 1 Our analysis in this paper is formally similar to the analysis of risk adjustment and cream-skimming in health insurance in Schokkaert et al. (1998) and Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2004) . 5 estimation will typically involve unobserved (…xed or random) e¤ects at the level of the pupil and the school as well as idiosyncratic error terms. In the next sections we will discuss how to treat these e¤ects in a practical application. For the theoretical analysis, however, we can consider these unobserved e¤ects to be part of the characterization of pupils. Each speci…c e¤ect then has to be assigned either to C or to R.
We de…ne a school funding scheme s : D jIj ! R jIj as a mapping of the pro…le x = (x i ) i2I into a subsidy vector s (x) = (s i (x)) i2I : For later use we can decompose pro…les x as (c; r). Of course, since y = f (x), simple output-related subsidy schemes are one speci…c example of s(x). More generally, however, we look for a funding scheme that does reward schools that are performing well, but at the same time corrects for di¤erences in pupil characteristics. What form should s(x) then take? To answer this question, we draw inspiration from the axiomatic social choice literature on fair allocations (Fleurbaey, 2008 ) and we will formulate two formal axioms, capturing the requirements of rewarding performance while avoiding cream-skimming.
First, we deal with reward for better performance. To remove the ambiguity due to di¤erences in pupil characteristics, we focus on performance comparisons between pupils with the same characteristics. Di¤erences in output between such pupils can only be due to di¤erences in school policy, and a good funding scheme should reward the better performing schools. We formalize this requirement as:
Reward: For all x in D jIj , there exists a proportionality factor > 0 such that, for all i; j in I, if
The "reward"axiom imposes that the subsidy di¤erence between the schools should be proportional to the output di¤erence, if the latter cannot be explained by di¤erences in pupil characteristics.
The right-hand side of the reward equation consists of two parts, a parameter and the output di¤erence (y i y j ). The parameter can be interpreted as a conversion factor transforming output (e.g., test score results) into money. Its value will re ‡ect the importance attached to performance incentives. Lowering will allow to downplay the monetary consequences of test score results; we will return to the choice of later in this section. Next, reward requires the subsidy di¤erence to be proportional to the output di¤erence, which seems at …rst sight rather restrictive. However, recall that output y is not necessarily a raw test score, but could also be a non-linear transformation of 6 such scores; we come back to this possibility later.
Second, since schools do not control the variables in C, output di¤erences that are only due to di¤erences in pupil characteristics should not be rewarded in the funding scheme. Equivalently, two schools that follow the same policy should be treated in the same way. We formalize this as
The basic idea of the axiom NCS1 is to link the subsidy scheme only to variables that are controlled by the schools. This is a necessary condition to get an unbiased performance indicator and it can also be seen as an equity requirement. For reasons explained in the introduction we use the term "no cream skimming". It is indeed obvious that incentives for cream skimming are removed in a subsidy scheme satisfying NCS1, since there will be no reward for improving test scores by attracting better pupils without changing policies.
The funding scheme s can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. In principle, we could think of a system in which the subsidies have to cover all school expenditures. In most educational systems, this is not very realistic however. It is therefore more relevant to interpret s(x) as a bonus scheme that aims at rewarding better performing schools and comes on top of (a) a budget to cover the …xed costs of the school, independent of the number of pupils, and/or (b) a basic …nancing scheme consisting of a …xed amount per pupil. Of course, the requirements introduced in this section are relevant in both interpretations. We will return to the budget constraint later in this section.
An impossibility result
If one wants to create incentives for better performance while at the same time correcting for the e¤ect of pupil characteristics, both the reward and the NCS1-axioms seem eminently sensible. It is therefore very striking that it is impossible to design a reward scheme that combines reward and NCS1 for all possible output functions f . This result is well known (under many variants) in the social choice literature (Fleurbaey, 2008) , but to the best of our knowledge has until now remained unnoticed in the literature on school accountability. For our purposes, it is su¢ cient to illustrate the proof with a simple example.
Figure 1 about here
Consider a continuous pupil type c, say socio-economic status, and two di¤erent school policies denoted r 1 and r 2 . Figure 1 presents output as a function of socio-economic status for both school policies. Take now two speci…c levels of socio-economic status, denoted c 1 and c 2 and construct the pro…le x = (x a ; x b ; x c ; x d ) = ((c 1 ; r 1 ) ; (c 1 ; r 2 ) ; (c 2 ; r 1 ); (c 2 ; r 2 )). Applying reward tells us that b
should get a higher subsidy than a, i.e., s b (x) > s a (x), since both pupils a and b have the same background, but school policy 2 succeeds in bringing pupil b at a higher output level. For the same
, as the same school policies (r 1 and r 2 respectively) apply to both pupils. All things together we get a cycle.
It is not di¢ cult to grasp the intuition behind this impossibility result. School policy r 1 is apparently more e¤ective for pupils with a higher level of socio-economic status, school policy r 2 is more e¤ective for pupils with a lower socio-economic status. In this situation it is obviously impossible to reward better performance without at the same time giving incentives to attract speci…c types of students. In some sense, with the educational production technology of Figure 1 , segregation (and cream-skimming) lead to a better overall performance. If one wants to reward performance, one will have to violate NCS1 and one will have to tolerate segregation. If one wants to avoid segregation, one will have to give up reward. In the social choice literature intermediate schemes have been formulated that satisfy weakened versions of the axioms (Fleurbaey, 2008) .
However, there is also another way out of the incompatability. This is to restrict the domain of admissible output functions f (x). As an example, note that the incompatibility disappears in Figure   1 if the lines for r 1 and r 2 are parallel to each other. We will follow the latter route in the next subsection.
Characterization of a subsidy scheme
In this section we will derive a funding scheme that satis…es reward and NCS1. However, to get a full characterization result, we introduce a multi-pro…le version of the no cream-skimming condition, stating that changes in the overall pupil population, without any change in the school policies,
should not a¤ect the distribution of the subsidies.
for all i in I. 
Reward implies that for all i; j in I;
Combining the two results yields that for all i; j in I; s i (x) s j (x) = [f (c; r i ) f (c; r j )], and thus, for all i; j in I with r i = r j , s i (x) = s j (x). This is condition NCS1.
Given the impossibility result in the previous subsection, we will therefore have to restrict ourselves to speci…c output functions if we want a funding scheme to satisfy reward and NCS2.
How do this subset of 'compatible'output functions and the resulting subsidy scheme look like? The next proposition gives a de…nite answer: the output function f (c; r) has to be additively separable between pupil type and school policy variables and the subsidy should be an a¢ ne transformation of the output part which is explained by school policy. such that for all x in D jIj and for all i in I, we have
with (r) > 0.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The funding scheme (1) allows the decision-maker to choose freely the parameters a (r) and (r). We add two simple requirements:
Budget balance: There exists an amount B 0 such that, for all x in D jIj , we have
Non-negativity:
Imposing a budget constraint for the regulator is certainly a reasonable thing to do. Fixing the budget B de…nes the …rst unknown a (r) : The relevancy of the non-negativity condition depends on the interpretation given to the funding scheme. If we take s(x) to be the only …nancing source for the schools, it certainly is highly recommendable that subsidies cannot be negative. The situation is less extreme when s(x) only refers to a bonus scheme (on top of other …nancing sources). However, while in this case it is in principle possible to have negative "subsidies"(…nes) as a kind of sanctions, it is more likely that the regulator would prefer to award only positive bonuses. In fact, non-negativity is not very demanding as it only imposes an upper bound on (r):
Proposition 2 follows directly from proposition 1, with a(r) de…ned by the budget constraint and (r) restricted by non-negativity. Let be the mean-operator, i.e.,
Proposition 2. Let f : D ! R be a function mapping types x = (c; r) into output y = f (x). A subsidy scheme s : D jIj ! R jIj satis…es reward, no cream-skimming 2, budget balance and non-negativity if and only if there exist
such that, for all x in D jIj and for all i in I, we have
with (r) > 0, and, in case
The subsidy that a school obtains for one of its pupils equals a per-capita share of the total budget B=jIj plus a correction factor based on the di¤erence between the output part of that pupil for which the school is responsible and the average 'responsible'output part (averaged over all pupils).
Given the additively separable speci…cation of f (c; r), equation (2) can be rewritten as
showing that the subsidy for a given pupil is equal to a …xed lump-sum amount B= jIj plus a fraction (depending on ) of (1) her relative performance (the di¤erence between her individual performance y i and the average overall performance [y i ]) plus (2) a correction for her characteristics, which will
Of course, in practice the funding will be calculated at the level of the school.
To implement the funding scheme (3), we have to know how the educational production function f and its components g and h look like. A necessary condition is that the function f be additively separable between compensation and responsibility variables. If we interpret y as a test score and f (c; r) as an educational production function, this is an empirical question. We can statistically test whether the additively separable speci…cation is an acceptable approximation of the true data generating process. This approach will be followed in the next sections.
Finally, as mentioned before, it is not necessary to interpret y as a raw test score. First, suppose test scores t = f 0 (c; r) and output y = m(t), a non-linear transformation of these scores.
Then the function f (c; r) = m(f 0 (c; r)) has to be additively separable in c and r, and this can be true even if the original educational production function f 0 (c; r) is not separable. Of course, this approach is not a panacea, since m(:) has normative implications and cannot be adapted freely. Second, value added can be written as y i = y i y i;0 , with y i;0 the initial test score of individual i. If the initial test score belongs to the compensation factors in C, we can de…ne
The subsidy scheme now becomes
From …rst best to second best?
It is worthwhile re ‡ecting about the normative status of the axioms that have been introduced in the previous sections. In some sense they can be seen as partial objectives of the regulator, but we did not introduce explicitly a fully speci…ed objective function; see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2008) . Moreover, the axioms are not formulated in terms of the …nal outcomes to be achieved, but rather as restrictions on the instruments (the subsidies) that can be used. The propositions then show that these restrictions completely …x the resulting funding scheme (and in the general case are even incompatible). On the other hand, the restrictions re ‡ected in the axioms do capture normative desiderata. This is certainly true for NCS1. It is also true for reward, however, and here the choice of y o¤ers a degree of freedom to the regulator. We mentioned already that y can be a function of the performance in di¤erent domains. Moreover, non-linear transformations of the raw test scores o¤er scope for introducing elitist or egalitarian considerations.
Another striking feature of our approach is that we did not include an explicit behavioral model of the school; see Barlevy and Neal (2009) who analyze incentive pay schemes in a model with teacher behavior. We did not describe how the allocation of subsidies a¤ects the choices made by the school (nor, for that matter, by the pupils). One can therefore interpret the previous analysis as essentially …rst-best. In our approach, the function f (c; r) should be seen as a reduced form equation and we implicitly assumed that it does not change if additional bonuses are awarded. This restriction is less severe than it may seem. First, there is a growing amount of empirical evidence that increasing …nancial resources of schools has at best a very limited e¤ect on performance (Hanushek, 2006; Wössmann, 2003) . It is true that giving bonuses and/or sanctions could motivate schools to organize themselves in a more e¢ cient way, and this more e¢ cient organization may improve results. However, that e¤ect is captured in our framework by changes in the chosen vector r, without changing the educational production function f (c; r). Second, the scheme that follows from Proposition 2 is incentive compatible. If the schools manage to improve performance (to increase y) while keeping pupil characteristics constant, they will be rewarded. Note, moreover, that while the formulation in equation (2) 
An alternative interpretation: performance measures
We have interpreted our axioms and results in terms of a funding scheme. This is not the only possible interpretation, however. One could as well argue that s(x) represents only a performance measure. Both the axioms reward and NCS1 remain valid in this measurement interpretation.
(Reward could be rebaptized as "performance sensitivity", NCS1 as "correction for pupil charac-12 teristics".) The impossibility result also remains relevant. However, the additional requirements of budget balance and non-negativity make much less sense, so that we should probably stick to the result in Proposition 1. The fact that a(r) and (r) can be freely chosen then indicates that our measurement of school performance is at the interval level, and the choice of parameter values boils down to an arbitrary standardization.
Empirical illustration, step one: explaining test scores
We now turn to one speci…c illustration of the general framework. For this illustration we assume that y is one-dimensional and only includes scores on a mathematics test. Our data are from Flanders, which is the biggest region in Belgium, with a separate educational policy. In this section we focus on the estimation of the function f (c; r). We …rst describe the data and then turn to the estimation results. We will test for the additive separability of f (c; r). The consequences for the school funding scheme are discussed in the next section.
The data
The data comes from the SiBO-project, whose aim is to describe and explain di¤erences in the primary school curriculum of Flemish pupils. We look at test score results in mathematics, socioeconomic background variables, and classroom data for a cohort of pupils during the …rst two grades (at the normal age of 6 and 7), corresponding with school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 respectively.
At Tables 1 and 2 respectively. The former include gender and age of the pupil, and education level and mother tongue of both parents. From the pupil's age, we constructed a dummy variable indicating whether the pupil is behind or ahead of age, and we distinguished the cases where this is due to a decision by the school itself or rather was already a fact at the moment the pupil entered the school. The class-related data include the total experience of the teacher, the class size, the common instruction time for math (in hours per week) and whether two teachers are teaching the class together or not. We also construct a peer-e¤ect variable as the average initial test score (begin grade 1) of all pupils in a certain grade at school.
Tables 1 and 2 about here
Observations on pupils can be missing for two reasons: missing test scores at the end of a grade and/or missing covariates. The estimation is based on the pupils'background characteristics, and-for the selection equation only-we exploit the fact that some schools agreed to participate in the SiBO-project, but not every year, which we consider to be an appropriate instrument. 3 The value for the non-tested pupils in grade 2 is unreliable due to the very low number of observations with incomplete covariates. 4 To limit the reduction in total sample size, and, given that missing covariates is not systematically linked with lower (initial) test score results in Table 3 , we add an additional classi…cation 'missing'to the covariate dummies; we do not report the corresponding estimates which are, as expected, all insigni…cant.
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Empirical model and results
Let y ijt be a single-valued test score of pupil i at school j at time t and z ijt a vector of observable regressors. We use a basic linear panel model
with a vector of marginal e¤ects and with the overall error term decomposed into a time-invariant pupil-level e¤ect u i , a school-grade level e¤ect v jt and an idiosyncratic error term w ijt . Since the mobility of pupils over schools is very limited in the sample, we assume conditional mean independence, i.e., E [u i jv jt ] = 0, to separate the unobserved pupil-level e¤ect u i from the unobserved school-grade level v jt .
The linear panel speci…cation satis…es the additive separability condition (as de…ned in propositions 1 and 2), independent of how the right-hand variables will be classi…ed into compensation and responsibility factors. The question remains however whether it is a reasonable speci…cation for the data. To test linearity, we performed a Box-Cox regression on the pooled data; see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005) . To be more precise, three models were tested: a Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable only, say y = 0 z, the same Box-Cox transformation for the dependent and the (continuous) covariates (y = 0 z , with = ), and a ‡exible speci…cation (y = 0 z ). 5 Table 4 presents, for each model, the 95% con…dence interval for (and possibly, ), as well as 'likelihood ratio'-test results (the 2 -value and the corresponding p-value) for the linear, loglinear or inverse hypothesis. Table 4 
about here
Note that the estimate for is close to 1 in all three cases, though statistically rejected in the reported likelihood ratio-tests. Still, it is clear that the linear speci…cation fares much better compared to the log-linear or inverse speci…cation, suggesting that a linear speci…cation is a reasonable approximation. To test for separability, we do have to classify the right-hand variables as either 5 Two additional remarks. First, since the dependent variable and some of the continuous covariates (like initial test score) are equal to zero for some observations, we added a very small amount to it; we obtain similar results by dropping these observations. Second, since separability between (some of) the covariates has not been tested yet, we reestimated these three Box-Cox regression models, while including all interaction e¤ects between the covariates; this inclusion of interactions did not change the conclusion of a 'mild'rejection of additivity.
compensation or responsibility factors. For the intermediate benchmark case-loosely speaking, pupil level variables/e¤ects are compensation factors, while school level e¤ects are responsibility factors (see later, for a more precise description)-, we test separability by testing the hypothesis that all interaction e¤ects between compensation and responsibility factors are equal to zero. The null hypothesis is statistically rejected (F (104; 656) = 11:77 with p = 0:000). However, since we are interested in predicting output (see later), it is important to note that the mean absolute deviation between the predicted output in both cases (resp. without and with interactions) is small (2.1%) compared to the average standard errors of the predictions (resp. 1.3% and 2.4%).
Tables 5 and 6 about here Table 5 provides a description of the variables used in the estimations, while Table 6 summarizes the results. As was to be expected, the initial test score plays an important role in all models. Its coe¢ cient is rather robust and smaller than 1, indicating that the added value, i.e., the gain in test scores, is larger for pupils with a lower initial test score. 6 The background variables play a more modest role and their e¤ects depend on whether or not the initial test score is taken up as a covariate. In model (c) without initial test score, boys do better than girls, being ahead of age is not signi…cant while lagging behind is correlated with a lower math performance, having Dutchspeaking and better educated parents improve test scores and these e¤ects are stronger and more signi…cant for mothers compared to fathers. In model (d) with initial test scores as an additional regressor, the estimated coe¢ cients for the background variables change in magnitude and even in sign. We provide two striking examples. First, once we correct for initial test scores, having Dutch-speaking parents gets a negative coe¢ cient. Indeed, pupils with non-Dutch speaking parents have (on average) a worse preparation before starting primary education. Therefore their initial test score underestimates their potential, leading to a catching-up e¤ect in the …rst grades. Second, the e¤ect of father education is now stronger than that of mother education. One hypothesis could be that mothers have a larger e¤ect on initial test scores (during the pre-primary education period), Before proceeding, recall Table 3 . Because of the high number of missing observations due to missing test score results in one of the periods, we did not check and/or correct for selection bias.
To check for selection bias we use a variable addition test; see Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and Wooldridge (1995) . More precisely, we add two dummies to the covariates indicating whether the pupil is tested at the end of period 1 (respectively period 2) or not. The results indicate that missingness might be informative, but only for the pupils who drop out after grade 1. To check whether selection correction in ‡uences our estimation results, we added a selection equation to each period in the spirit of Hausman and Wise (1979) , allowing for correlation between the individual level e¤ects in the selection and output equation. However, the corrected estimates do not statistically di¤er from the uncorrected estimates. 7 Finally, note that Ladd and Walsh (2002) have shown that a failure to correct for measurement error in the initial test scores may lead to a bias against lowperforming students. We do not dispose of good instruments to tackle the problem and we have therefore neglected it. In fact, our empirical application is only meant to be an illustration of how the theoretical concepts introduced in the previous section can be implemented.
Empirical illustration, step 2: …nancing schools
The next step is to use the results from estimating equation (4) to calculate the school subsidies following expressions (2) or (3). We have shown in the previous section that the assumption of additive separability is an acceptable approximation in our data. Two further issues remain.
First, we must classify the right-hand side variables (z ijt ; u i ; v jt ; w ijt ) as either compensation or responsibility factors. Second, (some of) the unobserved components have to be predicted. We discuss these methodological issues in greater detail in the next subsection. We then discuss how the funding scheme would look like for the Flemish schools in our sample.
Implementation
The partitioning of x in c and r is in the …rst place a normative exercise. The regulator has to decide about for which factors he wants to hold the schools responsible and for which factors he is willing to compensate. The procedure we have proposed will work for all possible partitionings of x. For illustrative reasons, we will focus on what we consider to be the most relevant benchmark case, in which we split up all observable factors z ijt into 1. compensation factors (denoted z c;ijt ): these include the peer e¤ect, the time e¤ect and all pupil-related variables, except the "ahead and behind age"-dummies when the decision about retainment or skipping a class is taken by the school itself.
2. responsibility factors (denoted z r;ijt ): these include the school-grade level variables except for the peer e¤ect, as well as the variables ahead and behind age, when the decision is taken by the school.
Note that it does not matter where the constant term is assigned to. With respect to the unobservables, we assume schools to be responsible for the unobserved school-grade e¤ect v jt , but not for the pupil e¤ect u i and the idiosyncratic error term w ijt .
To summarize, we interpret equation (4) as
Plugging this expression in the subsidy scheme (2) and using
The subsidy formula depends on the observed responsibility factors z r;ijt and on the unobserved school-grade e¤ect v jt . The latter must still be predicted. There are basically two ways to proceed from here (see, e.g., Longford, 1994, for a detailed discussion). One possibility is to use the posterior mean to predict v jt . This estimator is stable in small samples, but it is biased. We opted for using the unbiased OLS estimate, although this may be less stable. Note however that, with our data, the di¤erences between both methods are extremely small: the correlation between the resulting 8 Since we focus on a …xed pro…le, we replace (r) by .
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subsidy schemes is 0.999. In addition, the OLS-estimate has a decisive theoretical advantage, in that it allows us to express the total subsidy for a school-the sum of the subsidies for its pupilsas a function of school output and observable compensation factors, i.e., to implement scheme (3).
We argued in section 2 why this implementation is less vulnerable for manipulation and strategic gaming.
The OLS estimator equals
with (for an arbitrary vector a)
indicating whether pupil i has a test score at school j at time
Plugging this estimate into equation (6), and using the expression (capturing the assumption of
This expression is still at the individual level. In practice funding will be at the level of the school. Calculating the average school subsidy for school j, the …rst term between curly brackets averages out, and we are left with
This empirical counterpart of equation (3) is the basic expression that we use to calculate school subsidies in the next subsection. The average subsidy a school receives is equal to the per-capita share B= jIj plus a fraction (depending on ) of (1) This benchmark case is only one (albeit in our view the most attractive) possibility to implement our theoretical framework. Other normative choices are possible, e.g. one could have doubts about our classi…cation of the variables "ahead and behind age as chosen by the school"as a responsibility variable (is this a real choice?), or of the peer group-e¤ect as a compensation variable (can it not be controlled to some extent by the schools when they decide about the composition of their classes?). To illustrate the implications of di¤erent normative choices, we compare our benchmark case with two extreme cases. One is the "traditional" system without school accountability. In our theoretical framework, this means that all variables are in C. As equation (2) shows this leads to identical subsidies for all pupils and hence to a school funding system which only takes into account the number of pupils. This funding scheme does not give any …nancial incentives to improve performance in terms of test scores. A second extreme case is the simple accountability-approach in which there is no correction for pupil characteristics at all. In our framework, this means that all determinants are in R: Equation (3) then shows that school funding will be based on uncorrected output scores. As argued before, these are a biased indicator of school performance and using them for calculating the subsidies creates incentives for cream-skimming.
Results
Let us now look at the results for a selection of 58 schools (out of the 121 in our sample) where a su¢ cient number of pupils have been tested, i.e., more than 30 pupils and more than 80% of the relevant pupil population at the school. As an innocuous normalization, we take B = jIj, which means that schools would receive 1 unit per pupil if they were not held accountable at all. Using a simple performance measure, i.e., using only information about test scores, the higher a school is, the better it is considered to be. However, if we correct for pupil characteristics, a school will be considered better the further it is above and away from the diagonal line ( Then all schools to the left of the vertical axis would be considered to be relatively "disadvantaged", while all schools to the right of the vertical axis have a relatively "advantaged" pupil population.
Note that, even after correction, some of the former are poor performers, while some of the latter do even better than what could have been expected on the basis of their population. Still, there are more schools in the zones FN and FP than in the zones denoted A and B. This means that schools with a disadvantaged population are performing relatively well, while schools with an advantaged population are doing relatively poorly. This is not di¢ cult to explain in a setting where there is regulation through the imposition of minimal output norms. To reach the minimum performance level, "disadvantaged" schools must strive harder. In that sense, imposing minimal quality norms without su¢ ciently correcting for pupil characteristics, generates inequity between schools. receivers (in between 40%-tile and 60%-tile) and low receivers (<20%tile) for both the uncorrected and corrected subsidy scheme. Recall equation (7) and the decomposition of the proportionality part 9 The value = 1=30 guarantees non-negativity of the subsidies. Further decreasing would only bring the subsidies closer together on both axes.
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into relative performance minus relative pro…le. Table 7 presents the average relative performance (perf.) and the average relative pro…le (prof.) for these groups in each of the subsidy schemes. The uncorrected (simple accountability) approach allocates large subsidies to the good performers, with a very strong bias in favour of schools with an advantaged pro…le of pupil characteristics. Once we turn to the corrected (benchmark) case, however, mean performance is about the same for bottom, middle and top receivers. Top receivers are now mainly schools with a disadvantaged population, low receivers are schools with an advantaged pupil population. Note that this does not mean that relative performance does not play a role in the funding scheme, as equation (7) testi…es. It re ‡ects that di¤erences in performance are more strongly linked to pupil characteristics than to observable school variables, and that, in the present Flemish system of quality regulation, schools with more disadvantaged pupils (have to) perform better. 
Conclusion
Recent experiences have shown that introducing school accountability may create incentives for e¢ ciency. However, it is necessary to correct for individual pupil characteristics. Otherwise the performance measures are biased, creating perverse incentives for cream-skimming and leading to an inequitable treatment of schools with a disadvantaged pupil population. To calculate these corrections, one needs information on educational production functions. We have shown how this empirical information from the educational literature can be integrated in a coherent normative framework inspired by the growing non-welfarist literature on fair allocations.
We borrowed from this literature the insight that the requirements of rewarding performance and avoiding incentives for cream-skimming are incompatible on the general domain of educational production functions. However, restricting ourselves to educational production functions that are separable in pupil characteristics and in school policy variables, we characterized an attractive funding scheme that satis…es both requirements. This funding scheme uses only easily controllable information on average test scores and average pupil characteristics at the school level. Once one has an estimate of the educational production function, it can be easily implemented, and the separability assumption can be tested on the data.
Our application to Flemish schools shows that correcting for individual pupil characteristics leads to a substantial change in the performance measures, and hence in the subsidies allocated to the di¤erent schools. Moreover it revealed the interesting insight that a system with quality regulation without compensations for pupil characteristics forces only schools with a disadvantaged pupil population to perform relatively better in order to satisfy the quality norms. Even if the regulator is not willing to introduce …nancial accountability in the system (which may be the case in many European countries), it should then consider compensations for schools with a socially disadvantaged population. The only coherent way of calculating these compensations is to base them precisely on the additional e¤ort needed to reach the quality norms, i.e., to improve the scores for pupils that are more di¢ cult to educate. The information needed to calculate these compensations is then very similar to the information needed to implement our full funding scheme.
As we wanted to focus on the problem of correcting for pupil characteristics, we neglected a host of strategic and practical issues that have been documented in the empirical literature (such as teaching to the rating, selective retainment, measurement error, instability of the funding for smaller schools). Taking these into account in a satisfactory way would necessitate introducing a model of school (and pupil) behaviour into our theoretical setting. We then have to go beyond the enumeration of requirements that a good funding scheme has to satisfy and we have to specify a complete fair social ordering (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2008) . A …rst step in the direction of a more complete speci…cation of social objectives would be to extend our approach to multidimensional outcome measures (including also non-cognitive abilities) and to look at the potential implications of working with non-linear transformations of test scores to capture di¤erent egalitarian or elitist intuitions.
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Proof of proposition 1
It is easy to verify that, if the output function f is additively separable -i.e., there exist functions g : R jCj ! R and h : R jRj ! R such that f (c; r) = g (c) + h (r) for all x = (c; r) in D-, and if the subsidy scheme can be written (for all x in D jIj and for all i in I) as s i (x) = a (r) + (r) h (r i ), for some constants a (r) and (r) > 0, then it satis…es reward and no cream-skimming. We prove the opposite.
Step 1. If a subsidy scheme satis…es reward and no cream-skimming then the output function has to be additively separable between compensation and responsibility factors.
Note …rst that no cream-skimming requires subsidies to be a function of the responsibility pro…le r only, thus there exist a list of functions ( i ) i2I , such that, for all x in D jIj and for all i in I, s i (x) = i (r). Now, consider arbitrary c; c 0 in R jCj and r; r 0 in R jRj and construct pro…les Note that r = r 0 . Reward allows the proportionality factor to be pro…le-dependent, so, if we apply reward to pro…le x, we get
with e (x) > 0. Using no cream-skimming (and functions a and b ), we must have
with (r) > 0. Similarly, if we apply reward to pro…le x 0 we get
Combining both results, we must have for arbitrary (c; r) in D, as required.
Step 2. If a subsidy scheme satis…es reward and no cream-skimming, then the subsidy scheme can be written (for all x in D jIj and for all i in I) as s i (x) = a (r) + (r) h (r i ), for some constants a (r) and (r) > 0 and with h de…ned in step 1. Fixing the minimal subsidy s k (x) = k (r), and de…ning a (r) = k (r) (r) min i2I h (r i ), we get the desired representation s i (x) = a (r) + (r) h (r i ), with (r) > 0, as required. 
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